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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CAMERON LEE WATSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NOS. 48350-2020 & 48351-2020
ADA COUNTY NOS.
CR01-17-31677 & CR01-19-52078
APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Cameron L. Watson was on probation for burglary when she pled guilty to grand theft.
The district court revoked her probation and executed the underlying sentence of seven years,
with two years fixed, and sentenced her to eight years, with two and one-half years fixed, for
grand theft, to be served concurrently. Ms. Watson appeals. She argues the district court abused
its discretion by revoking her probation and imposing an excessive sentence.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In October 2017, Ms. Watson pled guilty to burglary. (No. 48350 R.,1 p.29.) The
following month, the district court sentenced her to seven years, with two years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction (“a rider”). (No. 48350 R., pp.41, 42–44.) In June 2018, the district court
held a rider review hearing and placed Ms. Watson on probation for seven years. (No. 48350
R., pp.46, 47–50.)
In January 2020, the State charged Ms. Watson by information with two counts of grand
theft, two counts of burglary, and one count of petit theft, after she stole two debit/credit cards
and a backpack and then went into two stores to use the cards. (No. 48351 R., pp.24–26.) The
State also moved for a probation violation in the 2017 burglary case for committing the new
offenses, along with many other violations, including drug use, failure to pay fines and fees, and
absconding from supervision. (No. 48350 R., pp.90–94.)
In May 2020, Ms. Watson pled guilty to one count of grand theft. (No. 48351 R., pp.41–
42; Tr.,2 p.9, L.11–p.10, L.25 (pp.9–10).) The State agreed to dismiss the other charges. (Aug.
R., p.1.) The State also agreed to recommend a sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, to
be served concurrent to any other sentence. (Aug. R., p.1.) In June 2020, Ms. Watson admitted to
violating her probation in the 2017 burglary case by using heroin while pregnant, using
methamphetamine, failing to complete moral recognition therapy, failing to complete the
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There are two clerk’s records on appeal. Citations to “No. 48350 R.” refer to the clerk’s record
in No. 48350-2020, Ada County No. CR01-17-31677. Citations to “No. 48351 R.” refer to the
clerk’s record in No. 48351-2020, Ada County No. CR01-19-52078.
2
A transcript was filed in both No. 48350-2020 and 48351-2020, but they are identical. The
transcript contains the entry of plea and sentencing hearing. Citations to the page number refer to
internal pagination of the individual transcript with a parenthetical cite to the overall page
number of the entire document.
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cognitive self-change program, and committing grand theft in the new case. (No. 48350
R., p.100.)
In August 2020, the district court held a consolidated sentencing hearing. (No. 48350
R., pp.102, 104.) The State requested the district court sentence Ms. Watson to ten years, with
three years fixed, to be served concurrently, for the new grand theft charge. (Tr., p.9, Ls.5–8
(p.21).) Ms. Watson requested the district court sentence her to eight years, with two years fixed,
for grand theft. (Tr., p.11, Ls.20–21 (p.21).) Ms. Watson did not argue against revocation and
imposition of her sentence in the 2017 burglary case. (Tr., p.10, Ls.23–24 (p.21), p.12, Ls.12–14
(p.22).) The district court sentenced her to eight years, with two and one-half years fixed, to be
served concurrently. (Tr., p.14, Ls.18–24 (p.22); No. 48351 R., pp.45–46.) The district court also
revoked her probation on the 2017 burglary case. (Tr., p.14, Ls.21–22 (p.22); No. 48350
R., pp.105–06.)
Ms. Watson timely appealed in both cases. (No. 48350 R., pp.108–09; No. 48351
R., pp.52–53.)

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Ms. Watson to eight years,
with two and one-half years fixed, for grand theft?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Watson’s probation for
burglary?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Ms. Watson To Eight Years, With
Two And One-Half Years Fixed, For Grand Theft
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Ms. Watson’s sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. See I.C. § 18-2408 (one-year minimum, fourteen-year maximum). Accordingly, to
show the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Ms. Watson “must show that the sentence, in light
of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand,
137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
In this case, Ms. Watson asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive fixed sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, she contends the
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district court should have sentenced her to a lesser fixed term of two years, rather than two and
one-half years, in light of the mitigating factors in her case.
Ms. Watson’s young age, substance abuse issues, and acceptance of responsibility and
remorse supported a more lenient fixed term of two years. Ms. Watson had a normal childhood
with a stable, supportive family. (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”),3 pp.98–99.)
Unfortunately, as a young teenager, she experienced depression and anxiety and turned to drugs
to cope. (PSI, pp.98, 101.) Her drug use slowly increased and, by
heroin and methamphetamine every day. (PSI, p.98.) Ms. Watson was

, she was using
when she

completed the rider for the 2017 burglary case. (PSI, p.109.) She was successful in the program,
but clearly struggled with maintaining her sobriety upon her release. (PSI, pp.110–12 (rider
review); PSI, pp.120, 123–24.) Looking back on her offenses and poor decisions while on
probation, she wrote:
I wish could find the words to show the remorse I feel for disrupting these
people’s lives that I did not consider enough to not have committed these crimes.
Secondly, I am sorry to my family for being absent with them and with my son. I
look forward to redeeming myself more and more everyday [sic], and I just ask
the Court to see into my heart and give me the opportunity to do that as soon as
possible. I’ve been manipulative and codependent for as long as I can remember,
and I desperately want to change who I am. I want to set myself up for success.
(PSI, p.125.) Ms. Watson stated that she was “so lost” in her addiction and was ashamed of her
actions. (PSI, p.120.) Once released after the instant case, Ms. Watson hoped to get stable
employment and spend time with her young child. (PSI, p.125.) These factors of Ms. Watson’s
age, substance abuse issues, and acceptance of responsibility and remorse stood in favor of
mitigation.
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Citations to the PSI refer to the 573-page document with the confidential exhibits, including the
PSI and addendum to the PSI, in No. 48350.
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In sum, Ms. Watson maintains the district court did not exercise reason and thus abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. She contends proper consideration of the
mitigating factors in her case supported a more lenient fixed sentence of two years, followed by
six years indeterminate.

II.
The District Court Abuse Its Discretion When It Revoked Ms. Watson’s Probation For Burglary
The district court is empowered by statute to revoke a defendant’s probation under
certain circumstances. I.C. §§ 19-2602, -2603, 20-222. The Court uses a two-step analysis to
review a probation revocation proceeding. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). First, the
Court determines “whether the defendant violated the terms of [her] probation.” Id. Second, “[i]f
it is determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of [her] probation,” the Court
examines “what should be the consequences of that violation.” Id. “[W]hen a probationer admits
to a direct violation of [her] probation agreement, no further inquiry into the question is
required.” State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 50 (Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted).
“After a probation violation has been proven, the decision to revoke probation and
pronounce sentence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Roy, 113 Idaho
388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987). “In determining whether to revoke probation a court must consider
whether probation is meeting the objective of rehabilitation while also providing adequate
protection for society.” State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995).
Here, Ms. Watson does not challenge her admissions to the alleged probation violations.
(No. 48350 R., p.100.) Instead, she argues the district court did not exercise reason by revoking
her probation, although she is mindful that she requested that the district court revoke her
probation and execute her sentence. “It has long been the law in Idaho that one may not
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successfully complain of errors one has acquiesced in or invited. Errors consented to, acquiesced
in, or invited are not reversible.” State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 420-21 (2015). Mindful of the
invited error doctrine, Ms. Watson maintains the district court abused its discretion by revoking
her probation, based on the mitigating factors argued in Part I.

CONCLUSION
In No. 48351, Ms. Watson respectfully requests this Court reduce her sentence as it
deems appropriate. In the alternative, she respectfully requests this Court vacate her judgment of
conviction and remand this case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. In No. 48350,
she respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court’s order revoking her probation and
remand her case to the district court for a new probation violation disposition hearing.
DATED this 26th day of March, 2021.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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